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Introduction 
Krista Thomason’s Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life (2018), develops 
a novel account of shame—one that advances our understanding of the emotion and 
its moral significance. On her account, shame is a response to a distinctive tension in 
one’s identity: one feels shame because one feels that one’s self-conception—one’s own 
sense of who one is—has been overshadowed by another part of one’s identity. So 
while I might not see my race, appearance, or tendency to be dishonest as central to 
who I am, I can come to be ashamed of these aspects of my identity if they are made 
salient by, say, a coworker’s comment. So understood, shame (more precisely: the 
liability to feel shame) is morally valuable because it is indicative of moral maturity. 
The shame I feel as the result of my coworker’s comment about my appearance 
reveals that I am open to criticism and that I recognize the standing of others—moral 
sensitivities that shameless individuals lack. 
This provocative account of shame and its moral value is combined with an 
important critical examination of competing views. By focusing on central but 
underappreciated features of shame, Thomason does much to reorient the 
philosophical discussion: an account of shame is deficient if it cannot explain (1) why 
we tend to feel shame when we are seen naked or (2) why shame tends to provoke 
violence. In addition to these contributions to research on shame, Thomason’s book 
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also adds—impressively—to philosophical work on identity and its role in social life 
as well as to a range of affiliated issues in moral psychology and emotion theory. For 
instance, Thomason’s “constitutive account” of moral emotions enriches our 
understanding of the value they have, and her chapter on shaming and stigmatizing 
offers a nuanced discussion of these practices and their moral costs.  
In what follows, we begin with an overview of Naked, separating this into a 
discussion of her challenges to competing proposals (section 1), her alternative 
account of shame and its moral value (section 2), and her critical assessment of 
shaming practices (section 3). While we raise some passing worries in this expository 
discussion, we use the next three sections to develop a larger set of worries that focus 
on Thomason’s explanation of shame’s core behavioral tendencies—hiding and 
violence (section 4), her account of shame’s moral value (section 5), and her 
provocative claim that, unlike other emotions, shame does not have correctness 
conditions (section 6). We conclude our discussion with some more general 
observations about the significance of Thomason’s proposal for existing debates about 
the nature of shame and its moral value (section 7). 
 
1. Thomason’s Critical Project: Challenging the Traditional and Naturalistic 
Accounts 
1.1. What we want from a theory of shame 
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According to Thomason, there are two types of paradigmatic shame episodes. First, 
there are instances of shame that suggest that it is a moral emotion. We see this in, 
for instance, the shame one feels about one’s infidelity; here, shame signals that one 
has failed to live up to one’s ideals and the emotion can prompt efforts to become a 
better person. Second, there is the shame we feel about our gender, our upbringing, 
or being seen naked. Here shame shows its dark side. Not only does shame of this 
sort seem to have nothing to do with one’s moral character, but it also tends to be 
destructive—prompting avoidance, withdrawal, and even violence.  
Given that shame is Janus-faced in this way, Thomason sees a successful 
philosophical account of shame as needing to meet two requirements (p. 15). First, 
it must explain how shame has moral value—a task made difficult by shame’s 
tendency to bring destructive behavior (the moral adequacy constraint). Second, a 
viable account must also provide a good conceptual analysis of the emotion; here the 
challenge is to develop an account that captures the wide range of situations in 
which we feel shame (the conceptual adequacy constraint). 
While these are familiar desiderata, Thomason adds a further constraint that 
enriches our understanding of shame and its value. Following other feminist 
philosophers (Calhoun (2004) in particular), Thomason argues that we should be 
hesitant to secure theoretical unity by dismissing cases of shame as “irrational” or 
“false.” After all, to dismiss shame about one’s race or sexuality as irrational would 
be to fault or patronize those with such marginalized identities (p. 37). But the fact 
that one is more likely to be ashamed of a social identity if that identity is 
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marginalized should not lead to the conclusion that the marginalized person is less 
rational, lacking autonomy, or somehow morally immature. So, for Thomason, the 
task of conceptual analysis requires making sense of all shame episodes, including 
those that other accounts exclude for one reason or another. 
1.2. Trouble for the Traditional and Naturalistic Views  
In Chapter 1 and the first part of Chapter 2, Thomason critically assesses what she 
takes the two most prominent accounts of shame to be: the traditional and 
naturalistic views.1 Classic versions of the traditional view of shame, like those of 
John Rawls (1971) and Gabriele Taylor (1985), fall along the following lines: shame 
is a response to one’s failure to live up to certain ideals. What exactly these “ideals” 
are (social, moral, or personal) and what constitutes a “failure” (a loss of self-
respect, a particular kind of self-doubt, or something that is perceived by others to 
be a failure) is a subject of debate. Importantly, though, traditional views see shame 
as autonomous: there is a strong connection between the elicitor of shame and one’s 
personal values or ideals (as opposed to ideals that one does not endorse or believe 
in).  
By contrast, the naturalistic view explains shame in terms of the submissive 
behaviors that humans have evolved to demonstrate in response to actions that are 
(in some way) inconsistent with certain social norms and expectations (e.g., Maibom 
2010, Keltner 1995, Gibbard 1990). Here, appeals to evolutionary psychology are 
                                                 
1 In Chapter 4, Thomason discusses a third, less prominent, family of pessimistic views—
accounts of shame that maintain the emotion has little moral value.  
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used to explain shame’s elicitors and behaviors, and the norms that one fails to live 
up to are specified as those of one’s social group. As such, naturalistic views do not 
propose that there is a strong connection between shame and autonomy. 
At first pass, traditional accounts seem well positioned to capture shame’s 
moral dimension (in virtue of shame’s connection to autonomy), while naturalistic 
accounts are better positioned to explain the wide range of situations that can elicit 
shame (in virtue of the lack of this connection). A central move in Thomason’s 
critical project is to use this observation to argue that neither the traditionalist nor 
the naturalist has the resources to both explain shame’s moral dimension and 
deliver a satisfactory conceptual analysis. While there is much richness in the 
criticisms Thomason develops on this front, they are bolstered by an intriguing set 
of arguments suggesting that the traditional and naturalistic views face further 
difficulties. Specifically, she argues that neither proposal can explain two 
paradigmatic types of shame: cases involving nudity and exposure, and cases where 
shame brings violence. Though others have noted shame’s connection to nudity and 
violence (e.g., Mason 2009, Maibom 2010, Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni 2012), 
Thomason argues that these cases merit greater attention given the significant role 
that they play in our understanding of what shame is (p. 11, 25). 
First, consider exposure. These cases are difficult for advocates of the 
traditional and naturalistic views to make sense of because it is not clear what is 
wrong—morally or socially—with being walked in on while, say, going to the 
bathroom or having sex. Traditionalists typically try to make sense of exposure-
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driven shame by maintaining either that the cases don’t really involve shame, but 
rather embarrassment (Kekes 1988), or that these are instances of “natural,” not 
moral, shame (Rawls 1971). But as Thomason points out, the move to reclassify 
shame as embarrassment fits poorly with our own experiences as well as 
autobiographical accounts of shame resulting from exposure (p. 27). Further, the 
suggestion that these are instances of some other type of shame seems ad hoc—
especially since “moral psychology does not have an example of any other emotion 
that admits of two fundamentally different types” (p. 28).2 Other traditionalists seek 
to explain the shame of exposure as concerning (personal or moral) ideals regarding 
modesty (e.g., Deonna, Rodogno & Teroni 2012). However, Thomason argues that this 
move is in tension with the traditionalists’ emphasis on shame as a morally valuable 
emotion. After all, one can feel shame even when the exposure that caused it wasn’t 
one’s fault. But if one can experience shame in situations for which one bears no 
responsibility, then it’s hard to see how it could be a morally beneficial emotion (p. 
34-5).3  
                                                 
2 While we agree with Thomason’s charge that the traditionalist’s splitting move is ad hoc, 
we are skeptical of her further claim that no emotions have sub-types. As we see it, the 
philosophical and psychological literature on emotions like disgust (e.g., Giner-Sorolla et al. 
2019; Kumar 2018) and anxiety (e.g., Öhman 2008; Kurth 2016, 2018) makes a plausible 
case that some emotions admit of fundamentally different types. In light of this, we think 
Thomason’s argument works because it successfully shifts the burden to the traditionalist: 
they must now provide a principled, empirically supported case for thinking there are 
different types of shame. 
3 We suspect the case here isn’t closed. Consider Williams’ (1976) discussion of the lorry 
driver who feels guilty about running over a child despite there being nothing he could have 
done to prevent it. That example suggests an emotion can be morally valuable—the lorry 
driver’s guilt reflects well on him—even when it misfires (i.e., the guilt is misplaced since 
the driver has done nothing wrong).  
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The naturalistic account (at least, Thomason’s characterization of it) fairs no 
better. As Thomason notes, the challenge here is to explain what social norm is 
violated when, for example, a teenage boy gets caught masturbating by his mother. 
While it is clear that there are norms against performing sexual acts in public, it’s 
not clear how the boy flouts those norms—after all, his privacy was violated by his 
mother. But if no norm was flouted, then naturalistic accounts cannot explain cases 
of shame due to exposure like these (p. 44-5). 
Turning to cases of violence in response to shame, Thomason looks at the 
psychological literature on violent reactions to shame as well as literary examples 
like Sophocles’ Ajax, Perry from Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood, and Bigger from 
Richard Wright’s Native Son. Shame’s connection to violence is important both 
because—as Thomason’s examples make plain—it is part of how we experience 
shame and because it complicates our understanding of shame’s moral relevance.  
In this regard, Thomason argues that, like exposure, violence in response to 
shame is difficult for existing accounts to explain. How does violence aid in, or make 
up for, failing to meet one’s moral or personal standards, as the traditional account 
maintains? In what sense can violence be an expression of submission, or help move 
an individual towards societal acceptance in the ways suggested by naturalistic 
proposals? Granted, some have replied that the shame-induced violence of, say, 
Ajax makes sense within the context of an honor culture (e.g., Taylor 1985). 
However, even if we grant that (but see Thomason’s retort p. 53-4), it does little to 
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explain the violence shame provokes in Perry and Bigger who are not members of 
honor based societies. 
Taken together, then, Thomason’s detailed examination of exposure and 
violence not only reveals unappreciated challenges to existing accounts of shame, but 
also advances our understanding of shame’s complexity. 
 
2. Thomason’s positive view: Shame and identity 
2.1. Identities, self-conception, and overshadowing 
Thomason uses the challenge of violence developed in Chapter 2 as a jumping-off 
point for the positive account of shame that she presents in Chapter 3. During a 
shame episode, we experience a loss of control. Thomason argues that we respond to 
shame with violence in an effort to regain the control that we feel we have lost. But 
what exactly is lost and regained here? Thomason proposes that when shame leads 
us to be violent, it is a response to our loss of control over a part of our identity. 
Violence, then, is our attempt to reclaim control over who we are. Much of the novelty 
in Thomason’s proposal comes in the account of identity that she develops both to 
explain shame’s connection to violence and to ground her larger account of the 
emotion.  
On Thomason’s account, the self has multiple, potentially conflicting 
dimensions. First, we have our voluntary self-conceptions: the person we take 
ourselves to be, how we try to present ourselves to others, and the features of 
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ourselves that we take to define who we are and that guide our decision-making. But 
we also have a social, public self that is, in a real sense, non-voluntary: the person 
that others take us to be. Crucially, these aspects of our selves can diverge. During 
an episode of shame, Thomason argues, some non-voluntary part of our identity 
overshadows our self-conception, creating a perceived tension between our 
social/public and private selves.4 In shame, the way the subject conceives of herself is 
overshadowed by a feature of her self that she wishes to hide, or at least that she 
wishes would not be as salient a part of her identity as it is on that occasion. So, for 
instance, even if I don’t see my ethnicity or socioeconomic status as important to my 
sense of self, I can become ashamed of them if, say, they are things that my father-
in-law focuses on in a conversation. Not only can Thomason’s proposal capture 
standard occasions of shame like this, but it can also explain cases that give 
traditional and naturalistic views trouble.  
First consider cases where shame brings violence. Having one’s self-conception 
overshadowed by a non-voluntary part of one’s identity can bring the feeling that one 
has lost control over one’s identity: the person one takes oneself to be is not the person 
others see one as being. Violence then becomes a way for one to reassert one’s agency 
(more specifically, one’s public image as an agent) in the face of its diminishment by 
the shame-eliciting experience. It is an “act of self-assertion” that allows one to “again 
feel defined by [one’s] self-conception” (p. 118).  
                                                 
4 Thomason is clear that this is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for shame. It seems to 
be the case that an experience of such a tension can lead to other emotions (particularly 
anger or frustration) or no affective experience at all. 
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Turning to cases where exposure or nudity bring shame, per Thomason’s 
account, these too are cases where one’s self-conception is overshadowed. In sexual 
activities (a couple having intercourse, the teenager masturbating), I “lose myself in 
my body.” So when I am caught in the act, I am “wrenched away from identifying 
with [my] body” in a way that leaves me feeling exposed: my self-conception (my 
identification of myself with my sexual body) is overshadowed my sudden realization 
of what I look like to others during sex (p. 114). This, in turn, explains why, when 
exposed, we try to hide ourselves or what we were caught doing.  
Thomason’s account also gives answers to some of the more vexing questions 
in debates about shame. For instance, much of the literature on shame focuses on the 
relationship between the subject of shame and her audience: what role does the ‘other’ 
play in an episode of shame? In contrast to the prominent contention that an (actual 
or imagined) audience is necessary for shame, Thomason argues an audience merely 
plays an instrumental role: while an audience can make certain features of one’s non-
voluntary identity salient, it’s the dynamics within oneself, between parts of one’s 
identity, that are ultimately what is necessary for eliciting shame.  
Similarly, Thomason’s proposal can also capture other cases that competing 
views have trouble explaining—like when a flattering remark brings shame. 
Consider Max Scheler’s (1987) example of the shame felt by a nude model when she 
is complimented by the artist who is painting her. On Thomason’s account, the model 
feels shame as the result of the tension she experiences between her self-conception 
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as a professional doing her job and her non-voluntary identity as a sexually attractive 
model (p. 154-5). 
However, while Thomason’s move to understand shame as a consequence of 
having one’s self-conception overshadowed has explanatory advantages over the 
traditional and naturalistic accounts, her proposal also seems underequipped to 
explain cases where part of one’s self-conception—not one’s non-voluntary self—is 
the source of one’s shame. Consider, for instance, a case where my self-conception 
includes the belief that I lack self-discipline. Suppose further that I am ashamed of 
this perceived deficit. Since lacking self-discipline is part of my self-conception, 
there is no overshadowing of who I take myself to be. This suggests there’s an 
important set of cases Thomason’s account cannot accommodate. 
In response, Thomason might argue that the tension lies between my non-
voluntary identity as a person lacking self-discipline (which is also a part of my self-
conception) and, say, another part of my self-conception—my view of myself as a 
decent student or as a person who can achieve her academic goals. Thomason could 
then say that my conception of myself as a capable student is overshadowed by my 
non-voluntary identity as someone lacking self-discipline. 
We see two problems with this reply. First, it does not fully address the 
concern being raised. Perhaps I don’t see myself as a decent student or a person who 
can achieve her academic goals. In those cases, we’re again left without a story 
about what gets overshadowed. Second, and more generally, Thomason’s proposal 
fits poorly with the phenomenology of shame in response to this kind of personal 
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failure. Intuitively, it is not that my undisciplined actions reveal a tension in my 
self-conception (as Thomason’s proposal suggests), but rather I am ashamed of a 
part of my self-conception because it fails to match up with certain social or 
personal ideals that I endorse. If this is right, not only does it deepen the problem 
that Thomason has explaining these cases of shame, but it also reveals that cases 
such as these are easy for her traditionalist and naturalistic opponents to explain. 
Switching gears a bit, while it’s clear how Thomason’s account differs from the 
traditionalist and naturalist proposals, the difference between her proposal and 
David Velleman’s (2001) view is more subtle. Velleman describes shame as a failure 
of “self-presentation,” a failure to present oneself as a competent agent. Like 
Thomason, Velleman emphasizes the differences between our private and public 
selves and the control we have over each. Both philosophers also see shame as a kind 
of failure to control how one comes off to others. Velleman, however, takes self-
presentation to be more than just control over one’s public image. Self-presentational 
successes are necessary for one to be a functioning social agent: “others cannot engage 
you in social interaction unless they find your behavior predictable and intelligible” 
(Velleman, 2001, p. 53). Failures of self-presentation are thus failures to present 
yourself as “an eligible target for interaction” (p. 54).  
 These affinities aside, Thomason argues that her account of shame is better on 
several fronts. First, Velleman’s account makes too much of the failures that bring 
shame. On his account, self-presentation is a matter of having a coherent self-
conception—it is “a sense-making activity where we try to construct a persona for 
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both ourselves and for others” (Thomason p. 86, footnote 3, emphasis added). But, 
pace Velleman, Thomason maintains that shame needn’t involve such a dramatic 
failure: we can be ashamed of things that in no way challenge our ability to 
successfully engage in social interaction. Second, given Velleman’s understanding of 
shame in terms of self-presentational success, he cannot explain shame that results 
from privacy violations—that is, exposures that are not the fault of the subject. 
Consider: if being caught having sex is truly a self-presentational failure, then this 
failure occurred before the violation of privacy. So, Velleman’s account delivers the 
implausible result that one should experience shame before one’s privacy is violated. 
Stepping back, Thomason’s account of shame is significant in a number of 
ways. Not only does she give an explanation for instances of shame that other views 
have trouble with, but she does so without appealing to the idea of “false” or 
“irrational” shame. She also captures the wide range of paradigmatic instances of 
shame, and responses to feeling shame. Central to all of this is Thomason’s move to, 
in a real sense, intellectualize the emotion. To see this, notice how Thomason’s 
account of shame’s connection to violence contrasts with what we get from the 
naturalistic proposal. On the naturalistic account, violent responses are understood 
as the (unfortunate) rearing up of some residual, hardwired proto-shame response 
(e.g., Maibom 2010). For Thomason, they are more strategic: violent responses are 
attempts to reassert control over one’s public identity. This intellectualizing of 
shame is also central to Thomason’s account of the shame of sex and exposure. As 
we have seen, her account explains shame by pointing to the tension between our 
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thoughts about how we look to others when having sex and our own identification of 
ourselves with our sexual bodies. However, as we argue below (section 4), we worry 
that this intellectualizing of shame comes at the expense of a plausible explanation 
of its phenomenology. 
2.2. The moral value of shame  
In Chapter 4, Thomason offers a novel account of shame’s moral value. Rather than 
maintaining that every shame episode is morally valuable, she argues for a 
“constitutive” account of the morality of shame. On this proposal, one’s capacity to 
feel shame is indicative of a kind of moral maturity. More specifically, someone with 
a liability to feel shame is someone who is sensitive to the way her self is socially 
defined: she is open to moral criticism and recognizes the moral standing of others 
(p. 12). This sensitivity contrasts with what we find in a shameless person. Such an 
individual takes her self-conception to be the final authority on who she is. Her 
shamelessness is morally problematic because it reveals her “failure to recognize 
the limitations of her own self-conception,” and so her failure to recognize her moral 
peers as such (p. 149).  
To illustrate this, Thomason discusses a shameless self-promotor. A person 
who constantly speaks highly of herself and who is closed-minded in the face of others’ 
criticism is someone who lacks the liability to feel shame. To the shameless self-
promotor, no one else’s conception of her identity matters; no other person has a say 
in who she is. In lacking this open-mindedness to others’ points of view and 
15 
 
conceptions of her, the shameless self-promoter fails to recognize others as people 
whose opinions matter (pp. 150-151).  
While this proposal surely captures part of what’s wrong with shamelessness, 
it also seems to miss something important. Consider the shameless adulterer. On 
Thomason’s account, the problem with his lack of shame is that—in dismissing the 
points of view of his wife and others—he takes himself to be the sole arbiter of his 
self-conception. But the problem here seems to concern more than just the issue of 
whose opinions matter for the construction of one’s identity. Rather, the adulterer’s 
shamelessness reveals that he does not recognize the damage his behavior has done 
to his (moral) standing as a self-respecting agent. Thomason might respond that were 
the shameless adulterer to recognize his wife’s point of view, he would see the harm 
that he has done to himself. But this reply underappreciates the moral power of 
shame—shame can be a direct signal of damage to one’s moral standing, as opposed 
to one that must be mediated by the perspectives of others. If this is right, then 
Thomason’s proposal fails to fully capture the moral value of shame.  
 
3. Thompson On Shaming Practices 
If a liability to feel shame is a sign of moral maturity, and if some episodes of shame 
can promote moral growth (e.g., the paradigmatic cases of shame in response to a 
moral failing), are we ever justified in making other people feel shame? Answering 
this question is the project of Chapter 5. Thomason’s discussion here is nuanced as 
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she identifies—and assess the moral merits of—various ways we might make another 
feel ashamed.  
First, there’s inviting shame. Someone is inviting shame when she tries to 
make another person see himself the way others see him by calling attention to how 
his behavior or attitudes are being viewed. The goal is to elicit a kind of self-
awareness that the person in question is lacking—namely, his awareness of his self’s 
social dimension (p. 179).  
By contrast, shaming practices, as Thomason characterizes them, involve 
publicizing attitudes or behavior in another that one sees as morally problematic. 
While there is overlap between inviting shame and shaming, shaming practices are 
specifically aimed at publicly highlighting the negative trait(s) of their target. It is 
shaming, not inviting shame, that tends to be a prominent practice on social media 
platforms. Thomason says that while shaming can also have the goal of promoting a 
kind of self-awareness, it’s typically used to censure its targets or try to change their 
behavior (p. 181). 
Lastly, there’s stigmatizing, a kind of shaming that focuses on the particular 
social identity of a group. The primary difference between stigmatizing and shaming 
is that stigmatizing “involves the manipulation of someone’s social status” as a result 
of what is being shamed; by contrast, the experience of shame is not a necessary part 
of stigmatizing (pp. 183-184). 
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Thomason’s conclusions about the moral status of these various practices are 
supported by the details of her account of shame and identity. She argues that public 
shaming is impermissible because those performing the shaming are trying to define 
their target by highlighting certain (negative) features. So while shamelessness is 
problematic because the shameless person fails to recognize the perspectives of her 
peers, the proper correction isn’t public shaming—for responding to shamelessness 
in that way would fail to respect the target’s self-conception. Even in cases where the 
target of shaming is a powerful corporation or a vehement racist, Thomason argues 
that there are more effective, and more morally acceptable, ways to reject certain 
ideologies than shaming. 
For similar reasons, inviting shame to motivate some kind of self-improvement 
in the target is also impermissible: we are not in the position to decide when another 
person needs the kind of feedback that inviting shame is trying to offer, and so to 
offer this unsolicited feedback is to display a kind of moral arrogance (p. 186). 
Thomason says that inviting shame to motivate self-improvement implies that we are 
in the position to “morally educate,” not just to judge, and being in the position to 
morally educate implies that we have achieved some higher moral status and are 
immune to the kind of flaws we are pointing out (p. 187). 
Thomason’s answer to the question of the permissibility of stigmatizing 
involves a rich discussion of shaming in legal punishment. Stigmatizing by the state 
is an immoral practice per Thomason because the state should not manipulate one’s 
ability to construct one’s identity, especially for the purpose of lowering one’s social 
18 
 
status (p. 213). Regarding extra-legal stigmatizing, Thomason raises concerns similar 
to those she raises against public shaming: while stigmatizing smokers, for example, 
might reduce smoking, it also lowers the social status of a group of people in a way 
that cannot be justified despite good intentions (p. 215). 
The only time that some form of shaming is morally permissible, according to 
Thomason, is when one is inviting shame in “moral self-defense” (p. 187). She uses 
the example of inviting an arrogant person to feel shame to illustrate this idea. An 
arrogant person sees those around her as lesser in some way, and expects them to see 
themselves as lesser as well. Because of this sense of superiority, inviting her to feel 
shame would be a morally permissible way to bring her down a notch. This case of 
moral self-defense is different from inviting shame for self-improvement because it 
does not imply that the shame-inviter is morally superior to the arrogant person (p. 
188). “When other people refuse to take us seriously [in the case of shamelessness] or 
when they think of themselves as more important than we are [due to arrogance, 
racism, etc.], invitations to shame protect our self-respect” (p. 190). 
With our overview complete, we turn to raise three worries before concluding 
with some general remarks about what Thomason’s proposal tells us about the nature 
of shame. 
 
4. A First Worry: The Explanation of Shame Responses 
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Thomason maintains that her account better explains the two dominant response 
tendencies associated with shame—hiding and violence. We are less sure.  
First consider Thomason’s account of the connection between shame and 
hiding. As she sees it, “once we feel defined or overshadowed by some aspect of 
ourselves, we often fear it will be permanent” (p. 104). By hiding, “we can remove 
ourselves from sight or if we can hide the thing that causes our shame, we can regain 
a sense of power or control” (p. 118). But this rendering of the connection between 
shame and hiding is puzzling. For one, hiding is surely inadequate as a strategy for 
regaining a sense of power over one’s identity—much less addressing a deficiency that 
one fears will become permanent. Moreover, the example of Hester Prynne from The 
Scarlet Letter reveals that shame can prompt strategies that are genuinely effective. 
As Thomason explains, Prynne’s acts of kindness allowed her to regain “a feeling of 
control by asserting her self-conception as an agent rather than as the passive 
recipient of contempt from the townspeople” (p. 120). But given that there are better 
strategies, and given that Thomason’s account takes shame to be a cognitively 
complex, intellectual emotion, why does hiding turn out to be the most common 
response to feeling shame (p. 118)? 
Turning to Thomason’s account of violence, as we’ve seen (section 2.1), shame 
brings violence because it’s a way for me to “again feel defined by [my] self-conception” 
(p. 118). Since this violence is an “act of self-assertion,” it is a manifestation of my 
agency, and “when I am seen as an agent, I feel as though my self-conception (not the 
parts of my identity that fall outside of it) is determining who I am” (p. 119). By 
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“becoming the object of resentment by doing something violent,” I can thus regain the 
feeling of control that I lost in my feelings of shame—through violence, I “once again 
feel that [my] self-conception determines who [I am]” (p. 120). 
But this explanation seems over-intellectualized insofar as it takes us to want 
to re-assert our agency in order to shore our self-conception and thereby regain 
control. While this might be true in some cases (Ajax, perhaps), it seems implausible 
as an account of all instances of shame. Consider one of Thomason’s central examples: 
Perry from Capote’s In Cold Blood. When Perry slits Mr. Clutter’s throat, is he best 
understood as doing that in order to restore his self-conception after feeling ashamed 
about looking for the coin? Or is it better seen as an unthinking, impulsive response 
that lacks any larger purpose? Perry’s statement that “I didn’t realize what I’d done 
until I heard the sound” (quoted by Thomason, p. 54, emphasis added) suggests the 
latter. We get more support for this less intellectualized explanation from Thomason’s 
discussion of Susan Miller’s (1985) empirical work on shame and violence. There she 
quotes Miller’s observation of individuals “reflexively attacking anyone who 
stimulates an incipient shame” (Thomason, p. 55, emphasis added).  
Our reading of these examples suggests Thomason’s account of shame over-
complicates the connection between shame and violence. Moreover, if violence in 
response to shame is as sophisticated as Thomason takes it to be, here too it seems 
that the person responding to shame would be able to realize that there are better 




We also find it hard to understand why, on Thomason’s account, shame would 
lead someone to attack a stranger or innocent bystander. Granted, such violence 
would allow you to reassert your agency in some sense. But that reassertion of agency 
wouldn’t be directed at (or necessarily noticed by) the person for whom it seems to 
matter—namely, the individual whose comments about you were what brought the 
shame about. As Thomason herself notes, “acts of violence are especially tempting 
responses to shame because the lack of control we experience in shame makes us feel 
powerless… I can make the same people who were just laughing at me quake and 
cower with my violent acts” (p. 120-1, emphasis added). 
These concerns with Thomason’s account of shame’s connection to violence are 
particularly pressing given that less intellectualized, naturalistic accounts seem to 
avoid them. On a sophisticated naturalistic account, shame is an emotion that is 
related to a more primitive proto-shame response—one that evolved to facilitate 
social interaction within the dominance hierarchies of our hominid ancestors. 
Importantly, proto-shame isn’t merely an emotion that developed to signal 
submission. It’s also one that motivates efforts—including violence—that have the 
potential to help one secure higher rank. As the evolutionary anthropologist Daniel 
Fessler explains, the capacity to experience proto-shame was “selected for because [it 
led] individuals to strive for dominance, a behavior which, in the long run, increases 
reproductive success” (1999, p. 90; also, Maibom 2010). However, since vestiges of 
proto-shame remain part of our psychological makeup, they can affect our behavior 
in shame-eliciting situations (often, in unfortunate ways). With this sophisticated 
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account of shame’s origins in hand, an advocate of the naturalistic account can then 
explain why Perry’s shame leads him to kill Mr. Clutter and why shame-provoked 
violence can be levied against strangers—in both cases, it’s an unfortunate 
manifestation of (proto-) shame’s driving an effort to assert dominance.  
 
5. A Second Worry: The Moral Value of Shame 
On Thomason’s account, shame—or, more precisely, a liability to feel shame—is a 
mark of moral maturity because it reveals that one does not take one’s own self-
conception to be the final authority on who one is. To be liable to shame means that 
others’ opinions can get one to rethink one’s own self-conception. We are concerned 
that this rendering of shame’s value is too liberal with respect to whose opinions 
should matter.  
As we read Thomason, her proposal entails that you should give “practical 
weight” to anyone’s assessments of your self-conception (pp. 98-101). But this strikes 
us as too extreme—surely some judgments about us are so out of bounds that they 
should be dismissed as irrelevant for one’s self-conception (and thus for feelings of 
shame). Why, for instance, should Nancy give weight to Donald’s insinuation that the 
fact that she’s a woman undermines her ability to be an effective leader (something 
that she takes herself to be)? 
Thomason’s concern here seems to be that if we don’t adopt a catholic approach 
and give weight to everyone’s opinions, we are no different than Bernard Williams’ 
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crank—someone who, in the face of dissent, just assumes his assessment of the 
matter is correct (p. 94). But while it seems true that determining whether someone’s 
opinion should be given weight admits of vagueness, it also seems true that cases like 
Donald’s remarks about Nancy should be given no weight at all. Furthermore, the 
issue here is not one that Thomason can easily address. To follow our suggestion and 
take only some opinions to have weight in our assessments of ourselves would suggest 
that only some sources of shame are appropriate—a conclusion that, as we’ve seen 
(section 1), Thomason clearly rejects. Perhaps this is why she suggests (implausibly, 
to our mind) that someone like Nancy should seek to “negotiate” with Donald about 
how much weight his judgments should have in her assessments of her leadership 
abilities (p. 100). 
Moreover, Thomason’s emphasis on the need to give weight to everyone’s 
opinions also seems to be in tension with her discussion of cases of inviting shame in 
another person as a legitimate mechanism of “moral self-defense” (pp. 187-190; also 
section 3 above). Thomason argues that attempting to elicit shame in another person 
is a morally permissible kind of self-defense when the target thinks lesser of you or 
does not take your perspective seriously. However, this suggests that developing a 
kind of shamelessness in the face of people who (like Donald) are dismissive of your 
moral standing can also be a form of moral self-defense. After all, to say that it’s 
morally permissible to invite shame in order to get someone to take seriously a 
perspective they dismiss entails that those dismissive attitudes should be rejected. 
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And if dismissive attitudes should be rejected, then—pace Thomason—a certain type 
of shamelessness in the face of those attitudes is morally valuable.  
 
6. A Final Worry: No Appropriateness Conditions for Shame 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Thomason’s account is her conclusion that 
shame has no appropriateness or fittingness conditions. For an emotion to be fitting 
in this technical sense is for the situation to be as the emotion presents it to be. The 
idea here is that emotions have evaluative content—e.g., fear is about danger, pride 
is about achievements—and so our emotions present our situations in a particular, 
evaluatively-loaded way. To say that my fear of the rabid dog is fitting is just to say 
that the dog really is dangerous. Understood in this way, assessments of fittingness 
are normative appraisals that presume that emotions can misfire—it’s unfitting to 
fear the harmless toy poodle.  
While Thomason thinks emotions like fear can be (un)fitting, she denies this is 
so for shame: “on my view, unlike fear or resentment, there is no independent 
standard for determining what counts as ‘properly’ shameful” (p. 170). Unlike fear, 
shame is a self-conscious emotion and, as such, the content it presents is about 
oneself—namely, that one’s self-conception is being overshadowed. Per Thomason, 
since shame is dependent on one’s perspective in this way, it is not something one can 
be mistaken about; its content is not something we can get a handle on independently 
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of the way we experience it (p. 171). While we find Thomason’s proposal provocative, 
we have three concerns. 
First, we find the arguments for thinking shame lacks appropriateness 
conditions unconvincing. For instance, Thomason points to the difficulty we have in 
specifying standards for what counts as an (in)appropriate instance of shame: given 
how disparate the range of things that prompt shame is, there’s little reason to think 
a standard of the appropriately shameful could be specified (pp. 169-70). But from the 
fact that it’s difficult to specify such a standard, we cannot conclude that no standard 
exists. Moreover, while we should allow that some (many?) claims about 
(in)appropriate shame might be contestable—and perhaps essentially so (e.g, D’Arms 
& Jacobson 2003)—we also have clear cases of inappropriate shame: shame about, 
for instance, one’s physical appearance, sexual orientation, or humble background.  
To bolster this first argument, Thomason suggests there are notable contrasts 
between shame, on the one hand, and other emotions like fear and resentment on the 
other. For fear and resentment—but not shame—it’s “easy” to give examples of what 
the proper targets of the emotion are. Similarly, for fear and resentment—but not 
shame—the range of proper targets is fairly narrow (p. 170). We are skeptical that 
these purported asymmetries are real. For one, the above discussion, as well as the 
philosophical literature on shame, casts doubt on the difficulty of specifying examples 
of shame’s proper domain. We also doubt whether emotions like fear are more likely 
than shame to admit of the narrow formal object characterizations (danger) as 
Thomason presumes (see, e.g., D’Arms & Jacobson 2017). Furthermore, even if we 
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grant that the range of proper sources of shame is diverse, it is unclear why this tells 
against the possibility of shame having correctness conditions. After all, emotions like 
disgust and anxiety are legion for their range of elicitors, but they are also emotions 
that appear to have correctness conditions (Kumar 2017, Kurth 2018). 
Second, Thomason’s conclusion seems to violate her own requirement that a 
viable account of shame must “provide a good conceptual analysis” of shame—one 
that matches the ways that we experience the emotion (p. 15). After all, not only do 
we say things like, “you shouldn’t be ashamed of your parents,” but we use such talk 
to mark out occasions where the shame one experiences is inappropriate (e.g. one’s 
father, though from a humble background, shouldn’t be a source of shame). In fact, 
we do not just raise questions about the appropriateness of shame felt by others, we 
also critically reflect on the appropriateness of our own feelings of shame: witness 
self-help publications like “When is it Appropriate to Feel Shame?” (Burgo 2013), 
“The Gift of Shame: A Positive Look on a Negative Emotion” (Pollock 2018), and “Is 
There a Place for Shame in your Parenting Toolbox?” (Hamaker 2018). Similarly, 
Thomason’s suggestion that talk of inappropriate shame needs to be reinterpreted—
that it is better understood as admonishments not to beat oneself up (p. 172)—fits 
poorly with the concerns that she has (following Calhoun 2004) about making blanket 
claims about errors in people’s talk about their experiences of shame (e.g., p. 38). 
Finally, suppose we follow Thomason in thinking that what matters for shame 
is just our experience of being overshadowed. Here too, we think there is trouble. To 
see this, first recall that, for Thomason, “the way that we come across to others is part 
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of our identity” (p. 97). Now notice: when a part of ourselves involved in this 
overshadowing is a product of how others see us, it seems we can be wrong about 
some part of this overshadowing. More specifically, while we cannot be wrong about 
how we experience the relationship between the parts of ourselves (our self-
conception and our social self), we can be wrong about the content of our social self. 
After all, it is constituted (in part) by others’ views of us, and we can be mistaken 
about what those views are.  
The upshot, then, is that shame can be unfitting even on Thomason’s account. 
Shame will be unfitting when the overshadowing we experience does not reflect how 
others see us. So, for instance, my shame is unfitting when my non-voluntary identity 
of having crooked teeth is not, in reality, overshadowing my self-conception (because, 
say, my peers never notice this feature of me). It might feel like it is overshadowed, 
which is why I am feeling ashamed, and this is still a very real intra-self tension. 
However, there is a way in which I am nonetheless wrong about the relationship 
between my self-conception and my social self. 
 
7. Taking Stock 
Though we have just raised a set of worries about Thomason’s account, one of the 
central virtues of her book is the way it enriches our understanding of shame and its 
value. So let us return to where we began. An adequate account of shame needs to 
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meet two conditions: it must (1) explain shame’s moral value and (2) provide a 
conceptual analysis that captures the range of situations in which we feel shame.  
The above critical observations suggest that Thomason’s account does not have 
an obvious advantage when it comes to explaining either shame’s moral value 
(sections 2.2, 5) or its tendency to bring hiding and violent behaviors (section 4). This, 
in turn, suggests that deciding whether her proposal beats out the competition—the 
traditional and naturalistic accounts—will turn less on questions about the moral 
adequacy of these proposals, and more on their conceptual adequacy. If that’s right, 
then making progress will require looking closely not only at the range of cases we 
feel shame, but also—since no account is likely to be able to accommodate all of 
them—how central those cases are. Yet we suspect that this latter assessment will 
be heavily influenced by one’s background methodological commitments.  
On this front, it’s worth noting both Thomason’s preference for examples from 
literature (p. 24), and her wariness of empirical work (p. 10). After all, this staring 
place not only gives shape to what she takes the “canonical” cases of shame to be, but 
also colors her understanding of what meeting the conceptual adequacy constraint 
involves. In light of this, we conclude with three observations.  
(1) Though direct comparisons are a bit difficult, the kinds of cases that 
Thomason focuses on do not match up well with empirical work investigating the 
types of situations that bring shame. On Thomason’s rendering, paradigmatic 
occasions of shame include situations where one feels the emotion as the result of (i) 
looking like a madman (Ajax), (ii) being seen naked or similarly exposed, (iii) having 
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someone of, say, a different race be nice to you (Bigger), and (iv) having attention 
drawn to one’s physical deformities or blemishes (Grealy).  
By contrast, according to empirical studies, the most common situations where 
individuals report feeling shame are (i) occasions involving a personal failure (e.g., 
academic, sports, work), (ii) situations where one has hurt another person 
emotionally, and (iii) times when one has failed to meet the expectations of others 
(Keltner & Buswell 1996; Tangney 1992). In fact, situations of the sort that Thomason 
focuses on are not mentioned very frequently in these studies.5  
(2) Given the cognitively rich way that shame manifests itself in the cases that 
Thomason focuses on (e.g., Ajax’s violence, being seen having sex), it’s unsurprising 
that her proposal takes shame to be an intellectually deep and conceptually complex 
emotion—one that is focused on how your conception of yourself fares in light of 
others’ perceptions of who you are. By contrast, a focus on what the empirical work 
identifies as the most common elicitors of shame seems (at least at first pass) to be a 
better fit with traditional and naturalistic accounts of shame.  
(3) Appreciating the disparity in the sources of shame noted in (1) raises 
questions about how we should understand one of Thomason’s central dialectical 
moves—namely, the charge that competing views should be rejected because they 
aren’t able to capture the “canonical instances” of shame (see, e.g., pp. 24, 25, 38-9, 
40, 48, 50). If the empirical work is correct, it suggests that “canonical instances” 
                                                 
5 Some have even argued that, in recent years, we have seen a decline in the shame caused 
by exposure and privacy that Thomason focuses on (e.g., Gurstein 1996). 
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should be understood normatively: the cases that Thomason focus on are the most 
important cases of shame, even if they are not the ones we experience most 
frequently. This thought, we suspect, is grounded in the fact that cases like these 
“abound in film and literature” (p. 24). But someone of a more naturalistic persuasion 
will be suspicious: these case are found in film and literature, not because they are 
the most important, but rather because they are the ones most ripe for dramatic 
development.  
Hence our prediction: assessments about the conceptual adequacy of a theory 
of shame will be heavily influenced by one’s methodological commitments. 
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